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Signature III Seminar
K.C. Choi
Department of Religious Studies
The two-day seminar offered a good window into the research interests of my Seton Hall
University colleagues in departments other than my own. Such a forum to listen, converse, and
exchange ideas with a broad spectrum of fellow faculty members are few, so I was appreciative of
the opportunity to do so under the framework of Signature III. A recurring question for me has
been the issue of how the various research programs (or course proposals) might reflect or fit into
what can be called the Catholic intellectual tradition (CIT). To be sure, CIT is itself something more
amorphous than rigidly defined, so in this respect, the many course proposals that were presented
can be seen as part of or contributing to CIT in some way. But is there a conceptual framework that
can help us (maybe, just help me) to better understand how the work of colleagues in various fields
represents CIT?
To some extent, course proposals from religious studies/theology and philosophy are the
easier cases. The harder cases are those from the social sciences, business, nursing, and so on. Our
moderator John Haughey’s reflection that CIT might be better understood as the Catholic
anthropological tradition is one that continues to resonate with me. I would modify it slightly—a
linguistic reformulation—and posit the Catholic humanistic tradition, and propose this as a conceptual
framework that might help us to better see how the various course proposals reflect the intentions
of the Signature III core.
The very idea of Christian humanism, to be sure, is today a contested notion, at least within
the academic fields of religious studies and theology. Much of the controversy centers around issues
of identity, traditionalism, ecclesial particularity, challenges of modernity (and post-modernity, if
there is such a thing), the prospects for mutual understanding, and so on. But despite the “politics”
of Christian humanism, Christian humanism as a conceptual framework for Signature III can
illumine in a constructive manner how the work of all the disciplines contributes to the catholicity of
Seton Hall and, correlatively, represents the spirit of the Catholic intellectual tradition. The great
twentieth-century, Jesuit theologian Karl Rahner is insightful in this regard. Again, like the idea of
Christian humanism, Rahner too is now a contested figure (after all, he was one of the leading
intellectual catalysts for the contemporary “revival” of Christian humanism). But the level of
disagreement he now engenders within Catholic and broader Christian communities are good
indications that his work is serious enough to wrangle over and thus certainly worthy for us at Seton
Hall to consider more seriously.
While space does not allow for a full treatment of what Rahner has to say about Christian
humanism, it suffices for our purposes to note that he begins with a theological account of why the
sphere of human affairs ought to be a critical focus for both believers and non-believers. To make it
short, the drama of salvation leads to what Rahner calls the unity of love of God and love of
neighbor. This means that all persons are called to love God, a love that is manifested concretely
when we love the neighbor (in this respect, we can say that all persons are called to love neighbor in
their call to love God). The upshot of all this is that the salvation of the individual person is not
achieved in some sort of esoteric spirituality or in splendid isolation outside from human history.
Rather, it is fully achieved in the human sphere, in all its dimensions (personal, public, economic,
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political, cultural), when, to be more specific, she serves her fellow-persons in self-less responsibility
and freedom. This is why Rahner thinks that Christian theology must always be “political theology,”
since theology—as intellectual reflection and examination of God’s activity in the world and,
correlatively, humanity’s response to such activity in the world—must always remind us of what it
means to be human: to love God, which is to love the neighbor as she exists in all spheres of worldly
life.1 Thus theology as political theology is also describable as “practical theology,” which is to say a
theology that informs humanity of what it means to love, how to love, or the manner in which one
ought to practice her call to love neighbor in response to God’s love for her.2 This love is not an
ahistorical, spiritualized love, but a love that manifests itself in the world; after all, the human person
is a social being who exists in political communities, participates in civic societies and economic
systems, is a member of a family, seeks friendships.
In referring to political or practical theology, Rahner is trying to suggest that Christianity
cannot above all be neglectful of what he refers to as the “humane future.”3 It is in this sense that
Rahner thinks that Christian theology is a humanistic endeavor, that is, an endeavor that seeks to
further understanding of human nature and to pursue the fullness of human personhood in the
world. And insofar as theology’s task is humanistic in the manner described, Rahner thinks that
Christian theology should exist in solidarity with other humanisms or the non-theological disciplines.
This is a striking statement in its recognition of other academic, scholarly disciplines as partners to
theology in their concern for furthering understanding of the human person and the pursuit of a
humane future. In fact, Rahner at times can be read as suggesting that the other disciplines or
humanisms may be better positioned and equipped to deepen such knowledge of human personhood.
For Rahner, one can call “Christianity Humanism” insofar as “it can enter into dialogue with
other humanisms.”4 But it must be made clear that while Christianity enters such dialogue with the
aim of learning more deeply about what is necessary for a humane future, such learning in turn
entails the recognition by the other humanisms that their claims about the human person are not
absolute, but must be seen as contributing to the fullness of what it means to be human in the
world. For Rahner, the task of dialogue is to gain “clearer awareness of those hoped-for aspects of
the future which have as yet been anticipated only dimly—justice, freedom, dignity, unity and diversity in
society.”5 In other words, theology must learn from the other humanisms if it is to better
contribute to a humane future, but in doing so the other humanisms must take it upon themselves to
affirm that their findings about the human person are not the singular answer to the question of a
humane future, that is, to the promotion of “justice, freedom, dignity, unity and diversity in society.”
Such matters cannot be resolved by the work of only one discipline (as if one discipline can have the
“future tucked away in his pocket like a complete five-year plan”6, but requires mutual collaboration
of all. As Rahner opines, “Must Christian and non-Christian humanists be enemies? I do not think
so, provided that both sides realize that their obligations are to the future….”7 The task of theology
and the non-theological disciplines is to work together as humanists, which is to say, to contribute in
mutually sustaining ways to the humane future, a future of “justice, freedom, dignity, unity and
diversity in society.” This task is frustrated when one discipline claims that it knows once and for all
what that future is. What that future is, theology cannot determine on its own, but only by
collaborating with its humanist partners. The fullness of the future—the humane future—belongs
to God, as Rahner suggests, and not to any one humanism, whether theology or the non-theological
disciplines.
I have left out many of the more technical, nuanced details of Rahner’s account of Christian
humanism (what I have described above may be too technical already). But what I have registered
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thus far illumines enough why Rahner thought that dialogue between non-Christians and Christians
is necessary, or why he thought that pluralistic discourse (discourse between all the humanisms) is
necessary. Such discourse, I think, was reflected in some measure at our Signature III seminar. And
I want to propose that a stronger sensibility to the kind of Christian humanism Rahner articulates
can make all of our various courses cohere in such a way as to reflect the fullness of the Catholic
intellectual tradition at Seton Hall. If there is anything to be taken away from Rahner’s vision of
Christian humanism is that the task of a Catholic university—as a society of various humanisms—is
mutual collaboration toward the fullness of human personhood, i.e., toward a humane future, “justice,
freedom, dignity, unity and diversity in society.” The mere expansion of knowledge, therefore, is
hardly adequate for a Catholic university; instead, the task is the expansion of knowledge in the
service of this fullness. In more theological terms, whatever our discipline, our task as
scholars/educators is self-realization in selfless love to others; it is to engender a capacious love; or,
it is to ready ourselves and our students to love neighbor, whether in the political or non-political, in
the public or private spheres, in the religious realm or the secular. And such readiness to love is,
ultimately, an anticipation and openness to the Kingdom of God.
******
The Signature III course I wish to propose and develop is a course that considers the
question of cultural diversity. As I articulated during the seminar, the question, more specifically, is
what it might mean to recognize the cultural identity of a person or persons. In short, this course is
about the meaning and significance (or perhaps the possibilities) of cultural pluralism—or
multiculturalism, call it what you like. Many of us take cultural pluralism for granted nowadays (just
look at our tri-state region), but it exists in strong tension with what has been a more typical political
philosophy in the modern U.S.: participation in the “public” requires neutrality, which means
cultural—whether ethnic, racial, or religious—identity is confined to the “private” sphere. But to
what extent does such a political philosophy diminish human personhood? Alternatively, to what
extent should plural, cultural expression be allowed in the public? At the heart of such questions is
whether cultural pluralism is a good. Accordingly, the aim of the course is to explore in what
normative sense cultural pluralism can be considered a public good—what is the limit and extent of
this good?
In the spirit of the Christian humanism described above, I would like to entertain the
foregoing questions from a theological framework (primarily Catholic but one that also includes the
wider Christian tradition) that is in dialogue with a number of non-theological perspectives
(philosophy, sociology, and law in particular). As a way of framing the question of cultural pluralism
and indicating the contemporary salience of the question, the course will begin with a number of
recent U.S. Supreme Court cases on affirmative action, school busing, and desegregation, as well as
explore current political debates on immigration reform and citizenship. The course will then turn
to a theological exploration of cultural pluralism through the themes of freedom, the nature of truth,
the relationship between church and state, and the role of religion in society, just to name a few.
Readings will draw from Vatican II documents, John Courtney Murray, S.J. (a contributor to Vatican
II’s Declaration on Religious Freedom), Thomas Aquinas, Augustine, the Mennonite John Howard Yoder
(a long-time theologian at Notre Dame), Pope John Paul II’s Veritatis Splendor, and others within the
Catholic-Christian intellectual tradition. This theological exploration of cultural pluralism will then
dialogue with other non-theological reflections (political theory and sociology, political and moral
philosophy). For instance, this section of the course will draw on the works of Alasdair MacIntyre,
John Dewey, and Amy Gutmann, and the more recent treatments of cosmopolitanism by K.
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Anthony Appiah and Martha Nussbaum. With all of this, my hope is that students taking the course
will be able to better articulate how Christianity can constructively contribute to the larger public
discussion on the contemporary challenges of cultural pluralism in law, politics, and religion.
References
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Signature III and the Hermeneutical Circle
Anthony L. Haynor
Department of Anthropology and Sociology
In attempting to make sense of the charge to us to develop Signature III courses within our
disciplines, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s notion of the “hermeneutical circle” (drawing on his teacher,
Heidegger) is both instructive and illuminating. Gadamer developed this influential notion most
clearly in his landmark work, Truth and Method (originally published as Wahrheit and Methode in 1965).
For starters, both Catholic thought, on the one hand, and the various disciplines, on the other, are “horizons” or “traditions.” As the philosopher, Thomas Nagel expressed it, there is no such
thing as a “view from nowhere.” Yet it is precisely such “decentering” and “decontextualizing” that
many argue was the hallmark of classicist and, later, Enlightenment thought (to which the CounterEnlightenment responded). For Gadamer, human beings can “interpret” objects (e.g. other people,
the so-called natural world, God, or most relevant to the present discussion, texts of one kind or
another) only through the horizons that they bring to their engagement with them. But, what is a
“horizon?” Simply put, it refers to a perspective or vantage point on the world that is rooted in
presuppositions (“prejudices” according to Gadamer) that guide, structure, and make possible our
meaningful connectedness to it. Gadamer tends to use “horizon” and “tradition” interchangeably,
which presents a bit of a problem. For a “tradition” requires that there be an “authority” of some
kind (a “guardian” group according to Anthony Giddens) in whom one trusts to interpret the
“teaching” by virtue of the “legitimacy” that is invested in the authority. A tradition is also characterized by a clear sense of peoplehood that is rooted in a shared ancestry, a shared present, and a
shared future. One of the challenges that we face in contemporary education is that many of our
students (even or perhaps especially those from a nominally Catholic background) do not subscribe
to a Catholic tradition as defined above. If we now live increasingly (certainly not exclusively) in a
“post-traditional” society (to use Giddens’ phrase), does that mean that we live in a society devoid of
“horizons?” This is the problem with equating “horizon” and “tradition.” While it is most definitely the case that many of our students are impoverished when it comes to their “traditional” moorings (which have become increasingly contentless and vacuous), this does not meant that they do
not have “horizons,” however incoherent and fragmented we might think they are. One of our
challenges as a faculty is to get our students to understand what their horizons are (whether “traditional” or not) and how they intersect with the texts in which we ask them to be engaged.
Hermeneutics as the study of interpretation involves by definition an interpreter and something (e.g. a text) to be interpreted. Within the context of Signature III courses, the interpreter can
fall into a number of categories. First and foremost, there is the “student” as interpreter. One thing
that should be fostered in Signature III courses is the students’ self-understanding of their horizons
in relation to their effort to make both disciplinary and Catholic texts intelligible and meaningful.
One possibility is that they embrace a horizon outside of their discipline and Catholicism that either
prevents both disciplinary and Catholic traditions from resonating or that frame their understanding
of both their discipline and Catholicism. Another possibility is that they embrace a disciplinary horizon that can be “applied” to Catholic thought. Another possibility is that they embrace a decidedly
Catholic horizon that can be “applied” to their discipline. Finally, their horizon can take a hybrid
form, in which their double commitment to a discipline and to Catholicism continually inform each
other. Overlaying this is the professor as interpreter. It is the responsibility (one could reasonably

argue the “moral” responsibility) of the professor to make transparent the “horizons” (that is the
prejudices) that are guiding his or her perspective on the text. This is course assumes that the professor is fully aware of what those prejudices are. So, what should also be fostered in Signature III
courses is an enhanced self-understanding on the part of professors as to their horizons (and corresponding prejudices). This could run the gamut from an uncritical acceptance of secular disciplinary
norms to a blind allegiance to Church authority, to a dogmatic skepticism of all attempts to uncover
or discover the truth, or even to Catholic bashing. The third category of interpreter would be texts
that attempt to make sense of the texts under consideration in the course. Of course, their relevance
in understanding the text as object depends on the horizons adopted by those (namely students and
the professor) who are drawing on them.
The “hermeneutical circle” commences with the process in which a text can derive its meaning only in terms of how the interpreter’s horizon is “applied” to it. This having been said, according
to Gadamer, the very process of engaging the text as object implicates the horizon itself. The horizon that makes possible the “conversation” with the text is forever changed by the conversation. It
is in this sense that the interpretive act comes full circle. This does not mean that the horizon is necessarily changed; it may in fact be reinforced. Even this scenario would not negate the fact that it is
in some significant sense changed by the encounter with the text. (The spiral metaphor is useful in
this context. One’s stance toward the world is in a sense unchanged, but one’s vantage point is at a
“higher” (that is richer) level of consciousness. However, a modification of the horizon in light of
the conversation is always possible. One’s prejudices are modified, deepened, or jettisoned. According to Gadamer, the “new” horizon is not any less prejudicial than the old one. (On this point, Gadamer would differ from Lonergan who argued that human beings are capable of becoming progressively less biased, and from the American pragmatists and Habermas, who argue that the existence of a dialogical community fosters the pursuit of the truth through rational argument.) The
hermeneutical circle, thus, for Gadamer, begins and ends with our “finitude” for we are ultimately
incapable of transcending the limitations of our “historical consciousness.” However, it is through
our encounter with the other (including texts) that the shape and texture of our historical consciousness take form. Our finitude, which makes possible our encounter with texts, bears the imprint of
those encounters. This is what Gadamer refers to as the “fusion of horizons.”
According to Gadamer, the hermeneutical circle requires an “openness” to what the text has
to offer, as well as an openness to having one’s horizon transformed by it. Within the context of the
Signature III courses to be developed, this would involve an openness on the part of both students
and faculty to the hermeneutical circle, in particular to modifying their disciplinary, Catholic, and
other horizons in light of a serious conversation with the “other.” One does not need to subscribe
in toto to Gadamer’s position to recognize the potential usefulness of the notion of the hermeneutical
circle in Signature III courses. Some would object to having all horizons on a level playing field, at a
Catholic sponsored University no less. I am not positing any such metaphysical equivalence. I am
arguing on behalf of an approach that can best foster the “conversations” that need to take place in
the academy in general, one that I would argue would advance the mission of Catholic universities
like Seton Hall.

Signature Three Course: Catholicism and Art
Richard M. Liddy
Department of Religious Studies
I enjoyed very much the seminar on the Signature Three courses facilitated by John
Haughey June 27-28. In particular I enjoyed the chance to get to know – or to know better
– fellow faculty members and their work. I found the diversity of personalities as well as
disciplines particularly engaging. At a seminar like this one senses new possibilities of
community than one had ever sensed before. I am grateful to my fellow participants for
sharing themselves during these days, and I hope we can do it again. Though I entered into
the conversation during the two days we were together, I did not mention the course I am
thinking about for Signature Three and that is an “upgrading” of the course I presently teach
on “Catholicism and Art.” It is a course I teach every other year and it is part of the
Catholic Studies program - though other students regularly take it as a free elective.
Currently it is a 2000 level course, but I am contemplating offering it as a Signature Three
3000 level course.
My own doctoral dissertation, “Art and Feeling: The Philosophy of Art of Susanne
K. Langer,” was on one of the foremost American philosophers of art. Though Langer
wrote from the 1940s through the 80s, her works are still featured by Harvard University
Press. My own philosophy teacher, Bernard Lonergan, leaned heavily on Langer in his work
on the philosophy of art and in this course I regularly weave in perspectives from Langer
and Lonergan.
The course studies the role of art in Christian history as well as contemporary
Catholic attitudes towards artistic creation and appreciation. It considers various examples
of early Christian, Byzantine, medieval, Renaissance and Baroque art; it also treats the
relationship between Catholicism and modern/postmodern art and what recent cultural
studies have called “the Catholic imagination.” Visiting speakers address the class on various
aspects of Catholicism and art through the centuries. Regularly class trips are arranged to the
Metropolitan Museum of Art and the Cloisters.
The objectives of the course are:
* to examine the relationships between the aesthetic/artistic patterns of
consciousness, (“zones”) and other patterns of consciousness: ordinary, commonsense consciousness, theoretical consciousness, religious consciousness
with the help of Bernard Lonergan and Susanne Langer to develop a language for
understanding art and aesthetic consciousness;
* to become familiar with the history of the relationship between Catholicism and art
* to become familiar with the Christian theological principles that have guided the
relationship between Christianity and the arts: e.g. the incarnation of Christ,
redemption, ecclesiology, sacramentality, liturgy, the historicity of culture, etc.;

* to become more sensitive to the role of art in Christian life and worship today
Recently I have come across two excellent texts for the course. One, The Clash of
Gods by Thomas F. Mathews, professor of the history of art at New York University,
surveys the various artistic images of Christ between the third and the sixth century and
challenges other scholars who have used the “emperor mystique” to interpret early Christian
iconography. Mathews’ contention is that the context for early Christian images of Christ
are the rival images of the ancient gods, so that Christ is presented as a magician, a
philosopher, and an androgynous figure. The book is an excellent example of art historical
scholarship.
The second work is more a survey of the topic of Catholicism and art and is by R.
Kevin Seasoltz, A Sense of the Sacred: Theological Foundations of Christian
Architecture and Art. This is more a “all you ever wanted to know” type of book on the
whole history of the relationship between Catholicism and Art.
Of course, in a course like this, what is involved is more than reading. I encourage
the students to seek out in person, in the museums and churches of New York and New
Jersey, examples of the relation between Catholicism and art. Also, today the internet makes
available countless classic examples of Christian art. In the first part of the course I will
focus on ancient and medieval art and in the second part I will focus on
modern/postmodern works.
Of course, all along I will be asking the methodological question: what are we doing
when we are doing it? Are we having an aesthetic experience? Or are we reflecting on it in a
theoretical way? Are we allowing ourselves to have the experience or are we engaged in
distracting considerations? Is the art becoming “didactic” or is there an experiential and
expressive component here?
Another question comes in for consideration: how did art, so wrapped up with
religion in its origins, become so alienated from the Church in the Enlightenment? What is
the story here? What about so-called “secular” art? Is there a “spiritual,” indeed a
“religious” element here? Is there a “catholic” element to all genuine art? And can some art
conceived under the rubric of religion be less than what might be hoped?

Developing the Third Signature Course
Vicente Medina
Department of Philosophy
I found our conversations about the development of third signature courses
stimulating. Despite our differences, it appears that most of us feel comfortable with the
recommendation that these courses will be developed within specific departments. This
recommendation seems pedagogically sound. Representatives of each discipline can engage
in fruitful dialogues with the Catholic intellectual tradition from their own areas of expertise.
In that way, we shall be able to do what we can do best, namely teach our strength.
The Catholic intellectual tradition is sufficiently rich and diverse to allow faculty
members from different disciplines to come up with interesting and challenging ideas in
developing their 3000 level signature three courses. I found all of the proposals or
suggestions discussed in the seminar for new courses interesting and promising. Some
seemed broader in scope than others, but their depth is what really matters. I was impressed
by the openness and receptiveness of those colleagues who shared their views with us during
the seminar. A real spirit of collegiality permeated our conversations.
I envision that some members of the department of philosophy will create several
signature three courses focusing, for example, on social and political issues, epistemological
issues, or metaphysical issues that are prominent in the Catholic intellectual tradition. When
I think of this tradition, the idea of social justice comes to mind; however, that is not the
only representative issue of the tradition, even though it is unquestionably an important one.
There are also fundamental issues such as the possibility of a virtuous life, the possibility of
empirical knowledge or transcendental knowledge, and the idea of faith, to mention only a
few. Since the spirit of human inquiry is to be critical so we can be liberated from prejudices
and false beliefs, those who choose to develop and/or teach these courses should be
responsible for promoting in our students a passion for critical inquiry rather than a passive
acceptance of controversial and dogmatic beliefs.
My perspective differs from the one that some of my colleagues take, including the
one assumed by the moderator John Haughey. According to some participants, signature
three courses ought to be informed by faith seeking understanding. On the contrary, I
assume that the spirit of these courses should be doubt seeking understanding. Such
Augustinian skepticism is congruent with the Catholic intellectual tradition. Nonetheless,
one could argue that those teaching these courses should have some kind of faith in the
possibility of acquiring human knowledge. If that were not to be the case, then our
pedagogy would be futile. It is precisely a belief in the possibility of human knowledge that
characterizes the Catholic intellectual tradition. Whether such a belief can be justified
remains a fundamental challenge of human inquiry. Hence, signature three courses that
explore epistemological issues in different disciplines from critical perspectives could offer
our students a worthwhile experience.
The Catholic intellectual tradition is grounded not only on a belief that human
knowledge is possible, but also on a belief that such knowledge is practical. In this tradition,
knowledge for its own sake is insufficient. Propositional knowledge or knowledge of that
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which is true is important to the extent that it informs our practical knowledge of how to act
in the world. If that is so, then one could argue that signature three courses should aim at
explaining the relationship between theoretical and practical knowledge. Yet our beliefs
regarding that relationship are not necessarily impregnable. They can be challenged.
Intellectual honesty demands a commitment to revise our beliefs when faced with
countervailing evidence. To act otherwise would be to embrace obscurantism and
dogmatism. These are vices that ought to be overcome by representatives of any worthwhile
tradition.
It is from the assumption that human knowledge is practical and hence good that the
Catholic intellectual tradition represents a truly ecumenical approach. Such an approach
embraces a distinctive conception of toleration. Catholic or Christian toleration is not based
on skepticism, but rather on a recognition that human knowledge is possible and yet limited
in scope. Our dialogical approach and respect for one another’s opinion during the seminar
was a good example of this kind of toleration. And yet if one accepts that there is such a
thing as truth and that it is possible to apprehend it, then there seems to be a real tension
between a Catholic or Christian commitment to that which is true and tolerating other set of
beliefs which are considered to be false. This tension is not unique to Catholic or Christian
toleration because other traditions face similar challenges. For example, despite its
commitment to toleration, liberalism needs to wrestle with the presence and advocacy of
militant intolerant groups who challenge liberal toleration. Hence, there seems to be no
liberal way to deal effectively with them.
Apparently, those of us who choose to develop and/or teach signature three courses
have the responsibility of explaining to our students how to reconcile truth and tolerance
from the perspectives of our own disciplines. But, if an instructor realizes that at times such
reconciliation is practically or conceptually impossible, then he or she must have the courage
and intellectual integrity to say so. The success or failure of signature three courses would
depend to a large extent on whether we are able to convey to our students a passion for
critical knowledge and for intellectual integrity. In the Catholic or Christian intellectual
tradition this passion is based on an impeccable respect for our human dignity as actual or
potential reasonable persons with a capacity for being free. But there is no such a thing as a
flawless tradition. So, to engage our students in an honest and fruitful dialogue with the
Catholic intellectual tradition we need to focus on both its virtues and its flaws. A
condescending paternalistic attitude would be anathema to the intellectual and personal
growth of our students. Thus, it is important to avoid a temptation to offer sanitized
versions of such a rich and diverse tradition.

There’s More to Beethoven’s 5th Symphony than duh-duh-duh dah!
My Take on the Third Signature Course
Athar Murtuza
School of Business
The seminar was a wonderful feast for intellect—thanks for making it possible!
If they are seen as discrete courses, like many if not most courses in today’s college
environment, the three Signature courses no matter how well designed can easily turn into
stones to step over for students, instead of being stepping stones to an educated conscious
and informed conscience,. What business majors pick up in their general studies courses
stays there and does not become, for most of them, a part of their skills; business students
for the most part, in my opinion, treat Arts and Science courses as stones to step over with
no residual aftermath. The third signature course could be something different if it were to
focus on what are assumed to be business topics, but teaching them in the contexts usually
associated with Arts and Humanities.
Beethoven’s Fifth symphony is a musical miracle but its catchy opening phrase made
up of three short notes and a long one happens to be a very small part of the total
symphonic transcendence. What makes the Fifth a musical miracle is how those notes are
echoed, repeated, and reverberated throughout the symphonic transcendence made possible
by Ludwig’s genius. Those musical notes are not stones to step over but stepping stones, a
veritable staircase leading listeners to transcendence. The signature courses are important
and are likely to be important stepping stones provided the lessons of those courses are
linked and integrated with the rest of students’ university experience.
The SHU’s curriculums, arts and science as well as professional ones designed for
nurses, teachers, journalists, lawyers, diplomats, priests, professors, or even accountants will
be better served if they are to the signature courses what the Beethoven’s 5th symphony is to
its starting notes. But that is not easily done—most acolytes of Mammon know of greed
and gluttony but St. Augustine’s confession let alone the meaning of Jesus’ gospel is not
easily or usually incorporated with the long and short of hedging. The High Priests, familiarly
known as AACSB accreditation imperatives, seemingly could care less for all that Jazz! The
curriculums of business disciplines, accounting for instance, march to its own drumbeat and
given its presumed sanctity—akin to Playboy bunnies’ look but don’t reach mystique—are
unlikely to make social justice, let alone the Deity, a part of their quotidian. Still the 3rd
signature course in the context of the framework that has been designed for it, can serve or
perhaps even subvert, by inoculating at least some accountants against a rabid propensity for
being made into minions for greed and gluttony.
My prescription for the section of the 3rd Signature course I hope to design and teach
is aiming to ask students (presumably accounting and finance majors but not exclusively) to
answer with the help of a semester’s worth of learning, a question: to what extent accounting
and accountants help, (as they are indeed capable of doing) or hinder (which they often do)
the attainment of social justice as prescribed in the Catholic social tradition as well as the
teaching of other faiths.

To make the question being asked in an accounting-grounded section of the 3rd
signature course more real, it could be related to the kind of capitalistic dogma that does not
blink even as 26,000 human beings die everyday from preventable causes. The course would
start by inculcating among students the realization that accounting not only implies counting,
it can also represent accounting for, as in accountability. Reaching through history, in Old
Testament, in Babylon and back when the Valley of Kings in Egypt was kingly with
Pharaohs and Joseph’s functions included managerial stewardship, accounting for
accountability was extant, while accounting for financial statements to facilitate speculation,
euphemistically called arbitrage, was not. Accounting students need to be made aware of the
genealogy of their profession. After the Industrial Revolution while corporations were
turning into behemoths, it was hoped accounting and auditing would keep them leashed for
the sake of public interest. Ironically, 20th Century saw corporations co-opting the
accounting profession and the accounting pedagogy dutifully followed the wake of such
financial titanics.
Such a historical survey of the origins of accounting within a course (reading, writing,
and critical-thought intensive) that seeks to place accounting in its evolutionary context
before analyzing what accountants do and the extent to which they contribute to social
justice would be a very rare (rarity being the mother-lode of profitable brand differentiation
as marketing strategist tell us) course indeed, if ‘twere to be! Inshaa Allah!

Reflections on Signature 3 and the disciplines
Cheree Quizon, Ph.D.
Department of Sociology & Anthropology
Revisiting the notes I took of the two day seminar reinforced my initial insight that
the best part of the experience was listening to the passion present in everyone’s teaching.
The next best thing for me, both as a teacher and scholar, was to listen to how others
fleshed out, in practice, ways of engaging the “Catholic intellectual tradition, broadly
defined.” It almost seemed like Signature 3 became the site for many hopes, not only for our
respective academic programs and for Seton Hall itself as an educational institution, but also
for our own disciplines’ potential contribution to our students’ personal and professional
lives.
Although I have participated in our university’s curricular initiatives in some other
ways, such as in the core “proficiencies”, I have not really been involved in the Signature 1
and 2 courses. It is a matter of relevance, really, since there are many other colleagues who
are in a better position, both in terms of training as well as in experience, to contribute to the
design and teaching of these particular courses. It is also a matter of practicality especially in
small departments like mine with few faculty members to spare. When the invitation for
Signature 3 came up, however, the disciplinal aspect was particularly intriguing and
challenging. My academic and intellectual perspectives from university onwards were forged
in large state (and proudly secular) tertiary institutions where excellence and service to others
is a core value but not framed within specific religious traditions. Teaching from within my
discipline with the words Catholic or Christian in the course description is an interesting
project not only because it was not something I had not done before (since I am not an
anthropologist of religion and my past positions were all in state universities) but also
because my discipline itself has quite a tradition of stubborn eccentricity, even a
methodological skepticism, where we study all human groups, the way they organize
themselves & live their lives, and where verbal claims or narratives are always considered
alongside actual behavior, and where “special” phenomena are always considered alongside
the “everyday” ones that we often take for granted. So even if I was raised Catholic and
educated until high school by Franciscan nuns who framed issues of poverty and social
justice in very consistent, almost self-consciously “consciousness-raising” ways, my own
religious background and practices have not explicitly informed my teaching nor my
scholarship.
Perhaps this is why alarm bells kind of rang in my head when our discussion leader,
John Haughey, framed the Signature 3 enterprise in terms of an explicit reference to God as
our “Co-laborer.” When John Ranieri also mentioned that model for Signature 3 shouldn’t
be about an existing syllabus with the Catholic aspect “helicoptered in,” I really began to
squirm, wondering if that applied to the course I was thinking about. Surely any qualified
individual, whether believer or non-believer should be able to teach, or take, the
anthropology course I have in mind but would that disqualify it for Signature 3? It is not
because I think it impossible (to teach with the starting premise of God as co-laborer in the
classroom) but the question in my mind is, should I? I keep thinking of the current US
President and how he makes the same revelatory arguments about his own decisions, and

what would appear as humility in some circles rankles as arrogance in others. Knowing what
I have come to know of the surprising diversity of our students’ spiritual beliefs and
practices also makes me disinclined to do so. In my four years teaching at Seton Hall, so
many of my students have opened up about their own personal beliefs and practices, writing
very frank essays and reflections about faith, organized religion, ritual cycles, their roles in
these events, their family contexts, the points of view of their peers. I am surprised by the
predictability of cultural and religious backgrounds on one hand (i.e. a high proportion of
self-identified Catholics and Christians from mainline/denominational churches) that
contrast with a greater diversity of actual faith-based practices (i.e. a significant proportion of
lapsed and/or hybrid religious activity). Perhaps it is because of the nature of anthropology
that explicitly advocates for the often misunderstood perspective of cultural relativism,
where one does not deny one’s own moral or ethical values but actively seek to understand
the underlying ideas of any value system, and to do so with a careful and analytic eye, perhaps
it is because of this intellectual climate in an anthropology classroom that makes students
feel safe or find the space to share aspects of their lives without fear, shame or
embarrassment, or to find themselves surprised to see connections with other lives lived in
faraway places. As we read and discuss and write about what we have to in the course of the
semester, they end up reflecting on their own spiritual journeys wherever that may lead, but
in the end, they need the intellectual space to figure out what they want to pack for the trip.
When John H. commented on the second day that we enter this world “traditioned”
(which sounds like a good opening lecture for Introduction to Cultural Anthropology), and
John R. pointed out that a Catholic education teaches ways of “beholding the world,” the
course I had in mind no longer seemed like a lost cause. Hearing from other participants
think out loud about their own possible Signature 3 courses also helped me consider other
possibilities in my own. Especially striking to me were the frank discussions about how the
proposed course should address professional ethical issues head on, whether in nursing or
accounting; how a philosophy course can be applied to the healing of the self or the sorting
out of actual life issues; or, how the course can help students navigate competing truth
claims whether in the context of inter-religious dialog, contemporary literature or in rituals
of citizenship & civic life.
When my turn came, it was very helpful to be forced to address a widely
interdisciplinary group. The course I have in mind is very specific, one that seeks to answer a
general question: What does it mean to be Catholic or Christian in cultural & geographical
regions of the world that fall outside “the West”? What kinds of cultural formations arise
many centuries after religious conversion especially when facilitated by larger social &
historical forces such as colonialism or conquest? If I had to draft a working title, I would
call it “Catholicism, Conversion & Post-Colonial Social Movements” and it can run initially
as a 3000 level ANTH topics course.
Standard teaching practice in anthropology combines reading actual field-based
ethnographies of contemporary communities in many parts of the world, alongside
theoretical consideration of models that help explain or analyze collective representations,
key symbols of identity/ethnicity and ensuing social formations. I hope to apply this classic
approach, along with a great deal of writing/journaling, preparation of their own miniethnographic projects that require field work, and conventional quizzes & exams. I have
specific book-length ethnographies and journal articles in mind that study how the

phenomena of Catholic conversion under Spanish and Portuguese colonial rule in Asia,
Africa & the Americas links to post-colonial social movements, especially those that frame
their endeavors in religious terms: pasyon (for Christ’s passion) and rebolusyon (revolution) in
late 19th century Philippines as well as the 20th century; missionary translations of Christian
doctrine into indigenous languages in Meso-America in the 18th-19th centuries and the impact
of the printing press in both proselytization as well as nationalist movements; the
phenomenon of the Christianized “plantation Indian” in New England as well as the
Hispanized Pueblo Indians of the American Southwest and the lives of their descendants,
among others. I will need help in finding other good field-based ethnographies that touch
upon Catholicism & conversion especially from sub-Saharan Africa (where my bibliographic
coverage can be better) as well as in not-so-obvious places such as South Korea, Goa in
India, the US territories in the South Pacific, or even the Christian communities in the
Middle East.
In subsequent discussion of my proposed course, I am particularly grateful for the
many helpful references and citations that were shared by those present, such as the one on
“operative theologies” as well as the recommended surveys/anthologies on “theologies of
religions.” I have begun to read up on some of these and appreciate that they are part of
others’ favorite teaching tool kits. Whether or not this skeletal framework holds promise as
a Signature 3 course (which I am curious to find out), I must say that I really welcome this
seminar. It came at a very good time, mid-summer, when there is a little bit of a pause in
teaching cycles and there is a bit more peace and languidness to stop and think about issues
that affect our professional and personal selves.

This Stuff
John Ranieri
Department of Philosophy
About a year ago I received a call from the college age daughter of a couple I am
friendly with in the parish where I am a weekend assistant. She had informed her parents
that she no longer wanted to go to church. They told her that before she followed through
on this decision she must speak to me first. If after meeting with me she still did not want to
attend Sunday Mass, they would accept her decision. Nancy (not her real name) dutifully met
with me and stopped going to church. During the course of our conversation she said,
“You’re an intellectual. How can you believe this stuff?” I am not sure what she meant by
“intellectual” so it was difficult for me to determine whether I would even want to be one.
By “this stuff” she seemed to mean Catholic Christianity. In any case, whatever an
intellectual was, Nancy firmly believed it excluded belief in Christianity as mediated through
the Roman Catholic tradition. She appeared exasperated with me when I told her that I not
only believed this stuff, but that it was the lens through which I viewed the world. From the
look on her face I could tell that I had now been banished from the garden of the
intellectuals.
I have no doubt that, to a significant degree, the Catholic Church is responsible for
creating the Nancys of our time. But I am also convinced that when it does so, it is being
unfaithful to itself. The problem, however, is not that students have been indoctrinated with
Catholic teaching and need to be liberated from the narrowness of their religious vision. In
fact our Catholic students come to us knowing little or nothing about the Catholic
intellectual tradition. Even the zealots among them, ever eager to guard orthodoxy against
what they perceive as a hostile modernity, simply wind up reducing the message of
Christianity to a position to be defended. I remember having a conversation with a student
after the class had read scripture scholar Jerome Murphy-O’Connor’s book, Becoming Human
Together. To my mind it is the best thing I have ever read on Paul’s understanding of
community. At the time I was using it in class as part of a three way comparison with
liberalism and Aristotle. The student stopped after class to say she had up until then no idea
this was what Christianity was about. In her case, what she had come to understand was very
appealing to her, but it is certainly conceivable in our culture that a student would come to
understand the gospel message and decide it was not for her/him. Whether the Nancys of
this world believe or not, whether they go to church or not, it would seem that a Catholic
university, at the very least, has a responsibility to help them make such a decision based on
knowledge rather than ignorance. I would add that this goal applies equally to the wisdom
traditions of all of our students. John Haughey, during previous visits, said something to the
effect that Seton Hall come to understand itself as a home to the faiths. Recent
conversations with friends and acquaintances belonging to other religions have helped me
realize how Catholics are not the only ones living with an impoverished notion of their
religious tradition. The vast majority of people I have encountered in pastoral ministry have
been people of sincere good will who wish to translate their faith into action. But there is an
enormous gap between the sophistication and depth of knowledge with which they operate
in their professional lives, and their understanding of the religious tradition from which they

wish to take their bearings. Why even have Catholic universities if they are unable or
unwilling to help bridge this gap?
There is a sense in which the three signature courses take their fundamental
orientation from this dilemma. Despite their superficial openness, in my experience, our
students inhabit incredibly narrow horizons –and not because of their religion. If they were
to seriously engage their own traditions and those of others they might actually be deepened
and become capable of genuine openness and adult faith. My reservations with regard to the
current approach to the signature courses is that we are overloading them with so many
additional tasks that we are leaving little or no space for the reflective engagement with the
texts. I fear we will wind up ruining what might have been an opportunity for deepening in
our students. Done well, these courses could help students and faculty realize that in
believing “this stuff” they are being neither doctrinaire nor silly And they still might be able
to go on to become intellectuals.

The “Inter” in Inter-disciplinary as the Space of Possibility
Anthony C. Sciglitano, Jr.
Department of Religious Studies
After an enjoyable three day conversation, facilitated by John Haughey, on a
fascinating array of Signature Three course possibilities, the inter-disciplinary character of
the Seton Hall Signature courses became more obvious than ever. Cultural anthropology,
sociology, political science, political theory, philosophical ideas of health, philosophy of
religion, and psychology were represented along with their particular avenues of questioning.
Everyone who is designing a syllabus for Signature Three is attempting to bring their
expertise into conversation with the Catholic intellectual tradition. Thus the course is by
definition inter-disciplinary.
What I want to reflect on here is not so much the methods of the different
disciplines, but rather on a possible justification for inter-disciplinary discourse and what that
“inter” might suggest to us and about us. Such reflection is not new. Bernard Lonergan’s
Insight, Paul Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, and Hans Georg Gadamer’s Truth
and Method stand as contemporary monuments to the importance of this endeavor. Indeed,
apart from such arguments and justifications, calls for inter-disciplinary study and a more
unified curriculum sound strained and shrill, perhaps fostered by various cultural and even
territorial fears rather than reflection and a genuine desire for inquiry.1
The first thing that strikes me is that there is no reason to suppose that different
disciplines can hold a conversation, much less support one another in an ongoing tradition
of inquiry. Why should sociology, for instance, want to converse with psychology; why
should economics feel a need to speak with a religious studies person? External justifications
for this conversation, i.e., because economics effects religious practice, will not do for at
least two reasons: first, this approach to the problem, while it holds some truth, generally
relegates one discipline to the status of second-class citizen. If we are truly interested in
inter-disciplinary study, then both disciplines need to be respected in their integrity. Religion
must be encountered qua religion, and not merely as an interesting place of economic
activity (and, of course, the other way ‘round). Second, we need to face the fact that
historically these various disciplines often emerge in conflict with one another. 2 Various
disciplines emerge from an agonistic context where they contest the validity and viability of
the others. I seriously doubt that all remnants of this contest have been exorcised from our
own assumptions about how a topic should be studied or what counts as rigorous analysis.3
Moreover, contemporary palliatives such as appeals to cultural and epistemological pluralism
or “difference” as justifications are often pleas to be left alone rather than a genuine
approach to the underlying issues.
Yet it may be startling for the benevolent to think of academic disciplines locked in
such a contest. I suspect we do not look across the table at our colleagues and say to
ourselves, “Geez, they sure have nothing to contribute to the intellectual enterprise.” What
tells against this historical agon are the actual collaborations that take place among professors

with different areas of expertise and the inter-disciplinary work of scholars in our fields.
Teilhard de Chardin and John Polkinghorne, for instance, joined science and theology in
highly suggestive ways, while Clifford Geertz brought the findings of philosophy of mind
and hermeneutics to bear on cultural anthropology. Indeed, examples abound. So our
experience gestures toward a need to transcend one’s own discipline when the questions
human beings ask move us beyond those boundaries. We then find ourselves moving
between disciplines, translating our questions into another idiom and back again, and trying
to be sure that each discipline receives its due. So it does happen; but why and how is it
possible that it happens? As I said earlier, what I want to explore here is the “between”
dynamic, what William Desmond might call the “metaxu” or metaxological space of thought
such that the plurality of intellectual discourses finds its justification as a legitimate plurality.
The first point of this justification is that no one discipline can provide the condition
for the possibility of all the others. For example, sociology cannot provide for the possibility
of a conversation between history and psychology, since this would only beg the question of
what makes the intercourse between sociology and history possible. In addition, if one
discipline could provide the possibility for the others, all other disciplines would need to
recognize that they find their justification in that discipline. Here we run a serious danger of
reductionism.
Two analogies should help move our discussion along. We can begin with a chess
game. If we ask, “what makes a chess game possible once we have all the pieces of the two
sides,” we cannot say, “another side.” Now we would have three sets of pieces and still no
game. Rather, something qualitatively different from the two sides is necessary: a board and
game rules. And the game rules have everything to do with how the two sides negotiate the
space (board) that allows them to play: a pawn can move one square forward at a time, save
for its first move and when it captures an opponent’s piece; a bishop can only move
diagonally, and it cannot move as a rook does, etc. Thus the board makes the game possible,
just as a court does for basketball teams, a field for baseball, etc. So the condition for the
possibility of game intercourse, so to speak, is something qualitatively different from the two
sides in the game itself, namely, a field of play.
More illuminating yet is the form of intercourse that is human sexual relations. What
makes sexual intercourse possible is certainly not a third person—for that would simply beg
the question as when we added another disicipline—nor only one of the partners, but rather
an underlying field of play, in this case, their common species-being or humanity and the
particular erotic drive built into it. We can push this line of inquiry a bit further. Human
being, or human nature, is not a third being in our series, but the field of play that makes
possible properly human sexual relations (we can thus restrict our metaphysical bed to a
Queen size). In addition, human nature is neither one nor the other partner. Nor do both
together add up to human being or exhaust it. One partner is not half of human nature, but
rather participates in the unity that is human nature without ever exhausting its possibilities.
No one human being, or even one million, exhaust the possibilities for being human.
Now a second point becomes equally important. While human sexual relations point
to a shared nature, that nature shows up nowhere but in actual human beings. One does not
have erotic intentions toward human nature as such, but with Sally, Padma, or Sean. So,
human nature depends upon particular human beings for its realization or existence, and

particular human beings are finite events or occurrences of the infinite possibilities inherent
to human nature. Moreover, both sexual and intellectual intercourse becomes possible
through a common ground in nature that both unifies and distinguishes the dialogue
partners. It unifies in that both are human beings, and differentiates in that each are different
realizations of human being where neither can be reduced to the other.
I have limited the discussion here to the human species, but only because we are
working our way back to a discussion of inter-disciplinary study, which, so far as I know, is
not of concern to hamsters or cats. The argument, then, is that the field that makes these
different types of intercourse possible is indeed the field called metaphysics. Now, this is
where care needs to be taken. By metaphysics, I do not mean this or that view of essences or
natures or even will, though all of these will require discussion. This kind of metaphysics
would not so much be the space on which other disciplines play as another disciplines itself.
For reasons stated above, this would not solve our dilemma.
At a more primal level, I would argue, metaphysics springs from two forms of love:
eros and agape, love that desires and love that serves. It is this that forms the playing field for
our different discursive endeavors now to be understood as different ways of inquiring into
the meaning of Being. We can speak of both forms of love in subjective and in objective
terms.
Eros (subjectively speaking): As children, we explore our world, its corners, crevices,
and colors in a desire to map it, understand it, and negotiate it. We desire to know and to be
known by others in our truest intentions and in our goodness. Oddly enough, apart from
being known (by parents, siblings, friends), our existence narrows to near nothingness. So we
desire communication, and we desire that those with whom we communicate grasp our
meaning, purpose, and concerns.4 We can see the intensity of this desire for communication
by way of the contrasts provided by experts in alienation: Edward Hopper paintings and
Michelangelo Antonioni films display the inability to reach out to others and communicate.
The characters move us by their immobility. So this desire is evident to the extent that it
finds fulfillment, but also to the extent to which we are misunderstood or discursively
paralyzed, Babel-like, in various and painful ways. Subjectively speaking, then, Eros signifies a
self-transcending desire for communication, recognition, and communion (as in, koinonia,
participation). Nor do we restrict ourselves to the bare necessities of social intercourse;
rather, we stretch out and communicate about the world that presents itself to us, about
things trivial and profound, and we seek not merely to exist, but joy itself—true communion.
Agape (or Love as service--subjectively speaking): In trying to know and
communicate our world, we serve two masters (but ultimately only one!). The first master is
the world around us. To know something is to give oneself over to it before doing anything
else—to allow it space within oneself to open up and breathe and come into the light of the
intellect. To believe that one can know something, that the world is knowable, is, of course,
a fundamental trust that the world is both intelligible and worth knowing. It is to pronounce
the wonder with which most of us begin our intellectual endeavors a genuine good. Thus we
serve the world by opening a space within our intellect to it, bringing it into the light of
knowledge, language, and image, and thus not only reflecting it, but in some sense creating it.
The effort to know is fundamentally an effort to serve what presents itself to be known and
to give that subject of knowledge over to language. This knowing, it should be said, is a

knowing from somewhere, a knowing that shapes the known and is also shaped by it as
reality resists efforts to completely manipulate it. A conversation is a good example here.
Nothing is more frustrating than speaking with someone and having them completely, and
perhaps willfully, misconstrue one’s meaning. Reading and writing form other examples. We
all say to students, “I think you’ve misread that” or “I don’t think that’s what you mean to
say.”5
Eros (objectively): If it is true that like Christina in the famous Wyeth painting we all
stretch towards a horizon, then perhaps it is also true that the world has always already
reached out to us (indeed, in us). The world comes to us primarily in images, sounds, and
smells that disclose underlying and infinite possibilities. A more formal way of saying this is
that Being is given to us in particular forms of being and particular realizations of those
forms. Being is given as the species dog and as this particular dog, Sophie. Only through
meeting Sophie, and others like her, does the human being encounter the dog species/nature
and hence one of the gifts of Being. But by no means do we say that this dog is the only
possibility inherent to dog-nature. Rather, Sophie points us to other dogs and other
possibilities that reflect the abundance and surprising nature of Being. The number of
possibilities increases as a species is capable of greater individualization and selfconsciousness. Moreover, Being seems to have a drive—a “desire”—to express itself and be
known somewhat like human beings do. This may sound odd, but if we think that we are not
entirely different from the animal kingdom and the world around us, then it should not be so
difficult to imagine that the human desire for communion is not absent in an analogical
sense from the rest of Being. Indeed, in being known, Being comes to the fulfillment at its
heart. Yet being known is never a static reality; knowing a particular thing is to know how
the abundance of Being gives itself and that Being is gift. Knowing the abundance of Being
as gift is to always point to the inexhaustible riches that can surprise and overwhelm the
knower—Being is mystery in its very giving of itself for knowledge. Being is mystery as
surplus.
Agape (objectively): If human beings serve the world through knowledge and will, it
is also the case that the world makes possible genuine human being as service. In other
words, without a world that gives itself to and for human knowledge, the human eros towards
communication and communion would be left without a partner. Agape, here, also speaks to
the indifference of Being in its giving. Being in its variety, color, majesty, and in its smallest,
most seemingly prosaic details gives itself to the poor and rich, the just and unjust, the petty
and the magnanimous. Being gives itself universally and without deference to the character
or status of the beholder (whether it is beheld is a different story). The attempt to be
indifferent to one’s self or one’s self-interest is likewise the call of the intellectual in her act
of knowing. One first tries to bring to light whatever presents itself in all its dimensions, just
as one tries to do justice to the position of an interlocutor. Everything else is ideology and
ego.
Disciplinary Intercourse:
What does all this have to do with inter-disciplinary study and its possibility? Interdisciplinary study involves the presupposition that the disciplines should not be reduced to
one über-discipline, and that no one discipline, alike to the others, can provide the
conditions for inter-disciplinary study. Rather, I am suggesting, it is the nature of Being and

the nature of being human wrapped up in the forms of love as desire and service that makes
inter-disciplinary study both possible and desirable. In this sense, all the disciplines should
view themselves as naturally opening onto a broader and more expansive web of Being than
all the disciplines, let alone any one, can ever account for. Moreover, if the human being is a
form of erotic openness and agapaic service in its very core, then it will be inclined to ask
questions—provided something does not block this—that transcend the ability of their
particular discipline and sends them screaming into the opening that they share with all the
other disciplines, the opening into the depths. The sociologist, after all, is not merely a
sociologist, but also a human person concerned with issues of psychological health and
economic viability. The theologian might ask why there is evil in the world in a general sense,
but this question will always also direct him to particular forms of economic, geo-political,
and social evil occurring in history. It is the excess of Being and the nature of human being,
then, that justifies forays outside our chosen disciplines and justifies a plurality of disciplines,
which is to say, conversely, that a reduction to one discipline would be to betray the various
ways in which Being can and should be known.6
We can finish with two observations: first, in our discussion at least, knowing is
inherently tied to love and service. Outside of this, knowledge itself can turn demonic.
Second, this relation of knowledge and love only makes sense insofar as Being itself is
viewed as a gift, as an intelligible and valuable reality that is worth loving. This means, then,
that at root intellectual intercourse properly rests upon an approach more fundamental than
any blank curiosity: it rests on gratitude.

1

In this atmosphere, proponents of a more unified curriculum decry the fragmentation of
knowledge, the demise of a pedagogical telos or purpose for education, the severing of any but the most
superficial of links—be sure to take that ethics course!—between college education and a well-lived life,
and the painful lack of basic knowledge or cultural literacy students can claim after spending an absurd
amount of money on their education. All of this lends credence to the not necessarily Marxist feeling that
education merely serves to marry up and off members of various classes and prepare young people for
their rightful place in the world of cubicles, sports radio, manicured lawns, and piles of bills—in short, a
life of quiet misery. Arguments against inter-disciplinary classes often focus on the lack of expertise this
implies, coupled again to issues of educational larceny. After all, it seems unreasonable or worse to present
a student who pays $25,000 per year with a course taught by a non-expert. An argument for interdisciplinary courses can hardly be an argument for ignorance or theft. Other “arguments against” involve
more practical matters such as tenure requirements and time to publish in one’s field—say, linguistics—
while trying to learn Dante for Signature Course 1. A longer piece would need to address these issues.
2 Philosophy emerges as a spiritual corrective or purification of myth, and myth will rebel and try to
swallow philosophy; sociology, at least in its Comtean and Marxist forms, has little truck with theology or
psychology. Philosophy and poetry knock heads again in the modern Enlightenment versus Romanticism

flare ups. Each discipline or discourse either contests its opponents ability to say something cogent about
reality or relegates them to a superstructure or epiphenomenal role in some larger system.
3 Claims, for instance, that evolutionary biology fully explains human behavior (E.O. Wilson), that
sociology “really” explains human beings as opposed to psychology, that all human endeavors stand on a
base of economic structures and everything else is superstructure (Marx, and the recent book,
Freakonomics) each marginalize other disciplines or types of discourse in some form or another.
4 I would also argue that this desire for communion emerges from a communion that is given prior or
with the original desire. Thus communion is present in some early stage prior to individuation.
5 I recall a student, writing on sex in marriage alone, in an exasperated tone, asking, “And what if it’s
monogamous?” She of course meant “monotonous.” I didn’t feel a need to answer either question. Here
we can observe a difference between eros and agape, and perhaps link the two as well. Eros springs from a
need, whereas agape responds to a need. Eros moves a person beyond themselves so that they can acquire
a world; agape then seeks to serve the world by giving itself (in intellect and will) over to it. Both are good;
both are necessary.
6 A more rigorous and lengthy treatment would need to discuss the different methods and their ways of
approaching Being (i.e., history studies Being as it is known in terms of time).

Signature Course Three Seminars- Response Paper
Theodora Sirota, Ph.D, APRN, BC
College of Nursing

Attending the signature course three seminars was a satisfying and highly instructive
experience for me. I was able to meet and enjoy dialogue with faculty members from many
other disciplines within the University. Hearing others’ points of view and perspectives on
the aims of Catholic education as well as how this can be accomplished within the various
disciplines allowed me to observe the breadth of intellectual and practical creativity
exemplified by the diverse body of faculty members who attended. As a Jewish woman
(albeit one who is rather familiar with the basic teachings of the Catholic church,) I learned
more deeply about the Catholic intellectual point of view and how this can be best translated
into the basic education of all Seton Hall University undergraduate students. I came away
with the view that our aim in developing the third signature course is to teach students how
Catholic intellectual tradition can inform their learning within any particular academic
discipline along with the mandate to help students discover how their own particular area of
specialization can be experienced as engaged in reaching out to human wholeness. We
would also strive toward helping students access a personal (and, in my view,
transformational) sense of G-d as collaborator in their intellectual development.
However, I must say that my strongest impression of the entire experience was
witnessing and being a part of a faculty group that conveyed a deep dedication to the
intellectual growth of our students within the Catholic tradition. The group process itself
felt somewhat like a religious experience. I could feel the University’s mission and
philosophy come alive in the values and thinking expressed by seminar participants
(something one often doesn’t feel so closely in our day-to-day activities!) I felt deeply
moved by the degree of commitment and spirituality expressed within the group and by our
facilitator, John.
In nursing we are educating students for practice where they will necessarily come in
daily contact with important questions about human existence. Nursing practice touches the
full range of human thought, belief and experience. Our students will be called upon to deal
directly with life, health and illness, dying and death. Students need to be able to confront
and share the deeply personal and emotional issues people face as they deal with difficult
medical diagnoses, pain, suffering and care choices that are often hard for patients to
process. Nurses are directly involved with issues of sexuality and reproduction, suicide,
euthanasia and genetic engineering as well as the full range of emotional struggles people go
through as they cope with health issues, including anger, shame, self-loathing, guilt over sin,
concerns about forgiveness and redemption, anger at G-d and loss of faith.
It is clear that Catholic intellectual and religious teachings, directly focused as they
are on all of these elements of our work, have much to offer nurses as they develop their
identity as caretakers and learn appropriate responses to patient need. All student nurses

need to clarify and develop a clear sense of personal belief and values in relation to their
practice. Additionally, nurses need to learn the ways in which a strong religious perspective
can us develop and maintain a consistent patient-centered identity and firm humanistic
approach to our work in the face of today’s health care climate, which is too often
impersonal and income-driven.
In my experience in nursing education, I find that students often fail to make the
connection between how content learned in various support courses may be integrated into
learning the nursing process. Also, although most students may have had a basic religious
education (Catholic or otherwise), I often find it surprising that so many of them start out
not thinking too deeply about how religious teachings do and should inform our work. I
believe that it is critical that students learn and fully understand that religious teachings can
and do inform the very heart of nursing practice.
Therefore, students need to integrate the intellectual skills that will enable them to
critically examine health care issues in the light of religious thought for application
throughout their career. In a Catholic institution such as Seton Hall University, it is
appropriate and expectable that all nursing students leave with a firm ability to understand
how Catholic religious teachings inform health care. Obviously, in nursing it is also
important that students learn and respect other religious and cultural traditions as well.
While educated in a foundation of Catholic religious belief, they need to be able to compare
and critique a range of other belief systems. The third signature course in nursing will
provide the opportunity for students to gain this important knowledge and skills. It will help
them translate the information they learned about the Catholic intellectual and religious
tradition in the first two signature courses into outcomes consisting of a) nursing identity
development, b) informed, appropriate responses to patient need c) developing a coherent
value system, informed by Catholic intellectual tradition, regarding major health care issues
of our time.
Listening to other seminar participants’ discussion about how they might develop
courses within their particular disciplines, I was able to mentally sketch out how our course
might look. I envision various sections of the course, each covering an important health
care topic that requires application of religious dialogue and understanding, emphasizing the
Catholic intellectual perspective. For example, the course might include such topics as a)
death and dying, b) pain and suffering, c) health care controversies such as suicide,
euthanasia, family and reproductive planning, d) spirituality in health and illness, e) culture in
health and illness, f) abuse (domestic, elder, child, etc). Teaching methods could include
some lecture, much discussion over case studies and clinical vignettes illustrating various
issues within the topics, role-playing to help students learn interactive skills with patients to
help them “live” the situations under discussion, use of journaling to help students process
their own feelings and value-development in relation to the topics and religious teachings as
well as aid in their own spiritual development and readings and other assignments that will
help clarify and aid discussion about the relation of Catholic and other religious traditions to
the issue of health care. Class discussion that will help students examine and clarify their
own spiritual beliefs and values will be emphasized, especially as they relate (or possibly
don’t relate) to Catholic teachings.

We will submit an outline by summer’s end and will work in committee to fully
develop our third signature course. Attending the seminars was exceedingly helpful in
directing our efforts and I am pleased to have had the opportunity to do so.

Core Curriculum Seminar on the Third Signature Course
Judith Chelius Stark, Ph.D.
Department of Philosophy
The core curriculum seminar on the third Signature Course provided us faculty with
a wonderful and fruitful opportunity to discuss and debate many of the fundamental
questions that, undoubtedly, will come to be included in a variety of ways in these courses
themselves. Like any good seminar leader, John Haughey S.J. proposed many provocative
questions for us to consider without finessing or forcing any preconceived results. In these
ways, he provided us with the opportunity to engage and challenge each other as we worked
out some preliminary ideas about how we might begin to construct proposals for the third
Signature Course for the new university core curriculum. Since we had the opportunity to
discuss these ideas outside the ordinary contexts of meetings for the usual business of
departments and the college, we were able to engage in frank and open discussions about the
intersections of religious faith and the methodologies of our own disciplines. This process is
both fraught and fruitful in my discipline of philosophy.
The fact that this seminar included colleagues from a number of disciplines,
including some outside the humanities and social sciences, made the exchanges that much
more valuable and enriching. Without minimizing our differences or reaching for superficial
and inadequate commonalities, I believe that we were able to listen, appreciate and disagree
in ways that often are neither sought out or valued sufficiently among us faculty. In fact, I
think the seminar mirrored and expressed some of the best qualities of informed, critical,
and appreciative academic discourse that stands at the heart of university life. While
engaging in this conversation among ourselves on these topics of the Catholic intellectual
tradition, broadly understood, we set ourselves the task of continuing this conversation and
of inviting our students to join us in the courses we may develop for the core curriculum.
As a result of participating in the seminar, I began to think more deeply about three
areas in particular: first, the qualities of mind and hear that enhance the academic
conversation; second, the relationship between my discipline of philosophy and the Catholic
intellectual tradition; and third, the course that I plan to develop on philosophy and social
justice for the third Signature course.
The Academic Conversation
Since our academic project is cooperative and communal, as well as individual and
solitary, I pondered the qualities that would enhance effective communication in the
academic conversation. Although these may seem very obvious, I wondered how much
explicit notice we gave them in the teaching-learning process by calling attention to them in
the classroom--openness, attentive listening, self-criticism, and mindful speech. We expect
our students to be open to new knowledge, information, and ways of organizing and
examining knowledge in methodical ways, but how open are we faculty to having our habits
of mind and pre-suppositions challenged? Are we open to being persuaded to abandon
some of our cherished notions and to change our minds? How well do we actively listen
and encourage our students to do likewise, and not just rush into the gap of the conversation
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with the next point we want to make? With the airwaves and cyberspace abuzz with blogs,
chatter, and “chat rooms”, how well equipped are we to distinguish among those claims and
conversations that are worth listening to? Self-criticism involves both inner-directed
awareness and outer-directed gathering of information and knowledge. How do we create
coherent and consistent views that are rigorous, well-examined, and also open to revision
when necessary? Finally, in our responses to others in the conversation, are we mindful and
careful in our speech, choosing and using our words to advance the communal search for
greater understanding and truth, and not simply for display or scoring debating points?
Catholic Intellectual Tradition
Within the first few centuries of Christianity, the early church fathers began using
philosophical concepts and principles in the task of “faith seeking understanding.”
Augustine of Hippo (354-430 C.E.) was one of the major architects of the grand synthesis of
Christianity and Neoplatonism that held sway for almost a millennium in the western
tradition. In fact, the Catholic intellectual tradition is intellectual precisely to the extent to
which these early authors used philosophical methods as ways to understand and explore the
meanings and implications of their religious faith. The creation of this synthesis was not
without its critics and detractors, for example witness Tertullian’s reposte: “What does
Athens have to do with Jerusalem?” Nevertheless, the works of Augustine and Thomas
Aquinas (among many others) attest to the conjunction of philosophy and theology that has
come to inform the Christian tradition to this day. With the rise of modern science and
modernity itself, philosophy and many other disciplines no longer serve as “handmaidens to
theology,” but the questions posed within the Catholic intellectual tradition continue to rely
on the clarity and cogency of philosophical methods. Tracing and exploring this on-going
relationship between contemporary philosophy and the Catholic intellectual tradition,
especially in the light of the crises of modernity and the loss of “easy faith” (Bonhoeffer)
would itself constitute a fruitful enterprise for the third Signature course. However, it is not
the one that I would develop at this point (I think one of my colleagues in the department
may be interested to propose this topic). The one that I am interested to propose is briefly
described below.
Philosophy and Social Justice
From its inception, a strong component of the Catholic intellectual tradition, broadly
understood, has been its concern for social justice and the on-going tensions between the
imperatives of the Gospel and the claims of the dominant culture. Ever since Jesus first
uttered his famous line “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to God the
things that are God’s,” Christian followers have been working out how to live “in the world,
but not of the world.” This is not the kind of issue that can be solved once and for all, as
Augustine himself realized when he wrote his masterpiece The City of God in which he
rendered the claims of ultimacy of both imperial Rome and triumphalist Constantinian
Christianity equally suspect. The course I will work on would look at the roots of
Augustine’s critique of these claims and his development of a Christian philosophy of history
as the foundation for exploring the principles and concerns of social justice in the
contemporary world, including, for example, papal documents, documents of the Second
Vatican Council, American Catholic bishops’ pastoral letters, writings of authors like Karl
Rahner, Thomas Merton, and Dorothy Day.
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By developing this course, I hope to invite students into the excitement and vitality
of the academic conversation by engaging their minds and hearts in studying the
contributions of the best of the Catholic intellectual tradition, especially as it has been put to
the test in the contemporary world.
I am grateful to have had the opportunity to discuss the many issues that were raised
during the seminar and especially thankful for the thoughtful and wise words of our seminar
leader, Rev. John Haughey. I look forward to continuing these conversations as we move
into the full implementation of the core curriculum in the next few years.

Reflections on “Developing the Third Signature Course”
Yvonne Unna
Department of Philosophy
The question that struck me most during our conversation was John Haughey’s
simple question “What are we going to do about the mess we are in?” which he raised in the
context of our brief excursion to the topic of salvation. It seems to me that this question can
be understood as entailing, in a nutshell, all those questions that could serve as a blueprint
for the design of a third signature course. Let me explain this.
One line of interpretation of the question could run as follows: The mess “we are in”
is not a fictional mess. It is a real mess, otherwise we would not “be in it” (I am excluding
Anthony’s “certifiably insane” aunt). Since the “we” refers to all those who grapple with this
question in one way or another, in other words to those who regard themselves as being
addressed by the question, the mess is a problem common to “us”. Furthermore, since “we”
are in a mess, we are not alone in it but face it together. And finally, since we are together in
a real mess, facing a problem common to us, we have to decide what it is we want to do
about it.
Though we were asked to write the response to the work shop from the perspective
of our “own discipline,” I have chosen to provide a personal response as a student and
teacher of philosophy not as a representative of the discipline which is simply too vast a
field.
As a Kantian, I am very much influenced by Kant’s call to practice and authenticity.
In his lecture on “Philosophische Enzyklopädie” Kant recounts Plato’s admonishment of an old
man who told him that he had listened to his lectures on virtue. According to Kant, Plato
asked the man: “When will you begin to live a virtuous life”? Commenting on Plato’s
response, Kant stresses that “one should not always speculate” but always put the results of
this speculation into practice. However, most philosophical prescriptions of how one ought
to live are unbearable to listen to laments Kant, because “they do not show us any means” of
how to fulfill them. (AA 29.1,1: 12, 8).
I am mentioning this passage because I see the third signature course as an
opportunity to discuss the means employed by philosophers and Catholic thinkers alike to
help us live a good life. The tentative title of this course is “Philosophy and Therapy.” For
the purpose of this particular course, the key questions outlined above, would provide the
following road map: Given our imperfections as human beings and their often horrific
consequences (“the mess we are in”) how can we (meaning all those who are concerned
about this question) go about improving ourselves.
One major focus of the course would be the literature on spiritual exercises (Ignatius
of Loyola, Stoics, Epicureans). Spiritual exercises can be understood as therapeutic devices
aimed at the improvement of the self for the purpose of living a moral life. Pierre Hadot, for

example, in his book Philosophy as a Way of Life stresses that the rich tradition of spiritual
exercises of Greco-Roman antiquity can be put to use in the twenty first century. Hadot
claims that Ignatius of Loyola’s Exercitia Spiritualia simply constitute a Christian version of
this Greco –Roman tradition, a claim that has to be scrutinized.
Even though the guidelines for creating a Signature III course ask that the course
should focus on the dialogue between the Catholic intellectual tradition and the respective
discipline, other religious traditions may also be covered. It would be contrary to the spirit of
the guiding question, if in answering the question of this particular human problem we
would not enter into a dialogue with all those, who because they ask and attempt to answer
the same question are included in the “we.” I certainly would like to engage other religions
such as Judaism (here come to mind, for example, the Therapeutae a group of Jewish ascetics
described by Philo in De vita contemplativa) and would appreciate it very much, if you would
let me know of any relevant texts from other religious traditions.
This course, as I envision it, develops themes from Signature Courses I and II as
required by the guidelines. The idea of self-knowledge for the purpose of self-improvement
is the focal point of Plato’s Apology read in Signature I. The connection between faith
(religion) and reason (philosophy) that provides the horizon for the course I propose to
teach is considered in Signature II.
Let me end these brief reflections by thanking all of you for two enjoyable and
enlightening mornings. It was a great opportunity to meet those of you I never had a chance
of meeting before and I sincerely hope that we will be able to continue our interdisciplinary
exchange of ideas in the future.
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“Give us ‘understanding’ of our understanding”
Gisela Webb
Department of Religious Studies
I have never experienced a faculty retreat facilitated by John Haughey that was not
an opportunity for great camaraderie as well as intellectual and spiritual growth. I am
forever grateful for these opportunities.
I came to the CORE III workshop with an idea for a course that would reflect an
aspect of the Catholic intellectual tradition that has been critically important to me, and that
is “Interreligious Dialogue,” an enterprise that had its modern academic roots in the era of a
post- Vatican II, post-Holocaust commitment to seek understanding of “self and other” in a
commitment to human knowing and justice in the face of historical ignorance, chauvinisms
and violence toward the projected “other.” I was fortunate to have been a graduate student
in Temple University’s Religion Department during the 1980’s when the likes of Gerard
Sloyan, Leonard Swidler, (Catholics), Zalman Schachter (Jewish), and Seyyed Hossein Nasr
(Muslim), Bibhhuti Yadav (Hinduism/Buddhism), John Raines and Thomas Dean (students
of Niebuhr and Tillich), were teaching courses in their own disciplines while organizing
public seminars with History of Religion/Comparative religion scholars such as Wilfred
Cantwell Smith, Hans Kung, and others. That era of “Interreligious Dialogue” did not bring
the political progress its participants may have hoped for, and, in fact, the project has waned.
Indeed there are many reasons that might have led to this stagnancy: perhaps the inability of
academic ‘dialogue’ on Israel/Palestine to effect sufficient on-ground progress in the long
Israeli/Palestinian crisis; perhaps the glaring omission of women’s voice in early
institutionally based ‘dialogue’ for a needed to be addressed. Sadly, the last two decades have
seen a rise of Jewish, Christian, Islamic, and Hindu fundamentalisms of various sorts.
My sense is that it is time to revamp what a course in Interreligious Dialogue could
and should be in this era, particularly here in a Catholic institution in the middle of the global
hub of cultural, racial, and religious diversity of the Newark-New York area. I have
experimented with an Interreligous Dialogue course in two different venues, one with
undergraduates at Seton Hall (junior level honors students, mostly Catholic), the other with
graduate students in Indonesia’s Ghadja Mada University (mostly Muslim, but also
Protestants, Catholics, and Hindus). What seemed to work , and what I would propose for
this third core course in Religious Studies at Seton Hall-- is one that begins with
Comparative Religions/Phenomenology readings (a comparative theologies model) so that
students can see philosophers’, theologians’, and social scientists’ perspectives on the
common structures that religion—the human quest for meaning—seems to take. We would
look at primary sources in religions to see the narratives that inform constructions
(theological, philosophical, ethical, social) –and their development of interpretations over
time. (I know I would want to do a serious comparative mysticism section, especially
Christian and Muslim developments). Finally, a contemporary interreligious dialogue would
need to look at on-ground social, economic, and environmental ills, and utilize comparative
ethics and social justice commitment to see how the our global community can find ways to
work together across religious lines.
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Moreover, I think there is an obvious service learning component to this course in
terms of investigation of /creation of /participation in on-ground dialogues, interfaith/interideological/ discussions on a range of issues, as they arise, and community programs related
to political, racial, social, economic, environmental justice. (David Burrell from Tantur
Ecumenical Center ‘just outside Jerusalem on the way to Bethlehem’ has spoken to us of the
Jewish/Christian/Muslim work done—both theoretical and on-ground—toward resolving
terrible long-standing and new problems in Israel/Palestine. There are several interfaith
service organizations wanting to link not only at a theological level, but at the level of praxis.
My course in Indonesia, the questions of religious truth/orthodoxies/praxis led to requests
for “special topics dialogues” to discuss intra-religious issues, for example ethical questions
involved in ‘conversion’ goals and tactics of Christians, and issues of gender and sexual
orientation within their traditions, proper (ethical, humane) ministry to poor. Catholics and
Muslims (from Java to Papua) together formed sex education groups for the poor, especially
geared toward the causes of prostitution. The development of such a course has a legacy in
the Religious Studies Department, with Father Jack Radano being asked to go to Rome in
the 1980’s to set up actual interreligious dialogues among and within traditions (ChristianJewish, Christian-Muslim) at the Vatican. We can continue that legacy of our department,
serving students across disciplines.

INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE: Theories/Practices
“BEYOND HEAVEN OR HELL, IN OR OUT, TRUE OR FALSE”
CORE III Course 2008 Instructor: Dr. Gisela Webb
Considering theologian Hans Kung’s claim that there can be ‘no global peace
without peace among religions’, in this course we will look at---and participate in-- the
phenomenon of inter-religious dialogue, seeking answers to such questions as: What is the
nature of religious language, experience, and truth claims? Are there common structures or core beliefs that all
religions share? Do all religions share a ‘mystical’ core that could bridge the divide among religions? How is
inter-religious dialogue used today in service of common social justice mandates across religions, such as
economic justice, ecological care, women’s rights, and peace?
Readings include selected texts representing comparative religionists, theologians,
and human rights activists on inter-religious dialogue. ( E.g., William James, Rudolf Otto,
Mircea Eliade, Wilfred Cantwell Smith John Paul II, Hans Kung, DuWei-Ming, , Bernard
Lonergan, Paul Knitter, Farid Esack, Zalman Schachter, Paul Tillich, Hisamatsu, Maseo
Abe, Seyyed Hossein Nasr,) as well as primary texts several religious traditions.

